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Abstract. While studies of the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth have shown it to be 
positive, significant and robust, it has rightly been argued that different areas of economic freedom may have 
quite different effects on growth. Along that line, Carlsson and Lundström (2002) present the surprising result 
that “International exchange: Freedom to trade with foreigners” is detrimental for growth. We find that “Taxes on 
international trade” seems to drive this result. However, using newer data and a more extensive sensitivity 




1.     Introduction 
 
In later years, the empirical growth literature has been expanded to include institutional 
measures of various kinds and, most recently, economic freedom as a potential explanatory 
variable. This is a term that denotes the degree to which an economy is market-oriented, in 
terms of economic institutions, fiscal and monetary policies, and certain outcomes. Several 
studies, using the fairly new Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI) from The Fraser 
Institute,1 have identified a positive empirical relationship between economic freedom and 
growth.2 However, as the exact interpretation of a composite variable is somewhat unclear, it 
is important to delve deeper and investigate in what exact way economic freedom can be 
beneficial for growth. Such an approach has been taken by e.g. Carlsson and Lundström 
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Journal (O’Driscoll, Holmes and O’Grady, 2002). The EFI and this other index are relatively similar in the overall 
implications, but since the EFI has been used more extensively in academic contexts (partly because the other 
index only goes back to 1995 and because it uses more subjective variables), it is the one used here. 
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  1(2002).3 They show that some elements of economic freedom are growth-enhancing, whereas 
others have no discernable, or even a negative, effect. The most surprising result is perhaps 
that the area “International exchange: Freedom to trade with foreigners” exerts a negative 
influence on economic growth.  
Ever since the days of Adam Smith, economists have argued that free trade 
increases the wealth of nations. The basic argument is that specialization on what one does 
relatively best entails rewards for everyone, even for those who do everything better than 
everybody else, in an absolute sense. Auxiliary arguments have also been proffered, e.g. that 
trade involves technology diffusion, transmission of knowledge and ideas, sharper 
competition, and an increase in market size in the presence of increasing returns to scale. 
Through these complementary mechanisms, trade can stimulate improvements in both 
physical and human capital as well as marginal factor productivity growth and, ultimately, 
national incomes.  
However, there have always been dissenters within the economics profession, 
generally focusing on various so-called market failures (in either factor or product markets). 
For instance, John Stuart Mill advocated infant-industry protection, and John Maynard 
Keynes argued for tariffs when there was high domestic unemployment.4 In recent years, the 
development of “strategic” trade theory and theories of oligopolistic competition have led 
some economists to question the ability of free trade to bring about better economic 
performance.5 Externalities and global commons, not least in the environmental area, have 
caused additional free-trade skepticism.  
Against this, the traditional pro-trade view has again been defended, as 
described by Bhagwati (2001) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2001), by arguments like the 
following: i) oftentimes the distortion in question is domestic and should be addressed by 
means of domestic policy in conjunction with free trade; ii) there is no reason to expect these 
theoretically described distortions to be important de facto; and iii) introducing 
protectionism into the political arena may, given how politics really works, yield more 
distortions than the original market distortions, through rent seeking, retaliation etc. And 
while earlier theoretical growth models, such as the Solow version, indicated that trade is of 
no importance for growth, newer models, in which the steady-state growth rate is not an 
exogenous constant, imply that trade can generate growth.6  
There are, then, theoretical arguments both to support the contention that free 
trade improves economic performance (relative to protectionism) and the opposite view. 
Hence, this is, in the end, an empirical issue. The bulk of the literature supports the view that 
                                                 
3 Cf. Ayal and Karras (1998). 
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5 See e.g. Krugman (1987). 
6 See e.g. Ben-David and Loewy (1998) and Srinivasan (1999a, 1999b). 
  2free trade and trade openness does have, at least some, positive effects on efficiency and 
growth.7 Some recent historical studies contain the interesting finding that such positive 
effects appear to be a recent, post-1970-phenomenon. Clemens and Williamson (2002) 
actually find that before World War II, higher tariffs were associated with higher growth.8  
The contribution of this paper is threefold: first, we use a new version of the EFI 
and conduct more extensive sensitivity analyses to see if the Carlsson & Lundström (2002) 
result on trade openness holds; second, we decompose the index even further, down to its 
most basic elements, to get more information on what, exactly, drives the result; and third, by 
using the EFI, we are able to control for the growth effects of other market-oriented policy 
changes that often take place at the same time as trade liberalization (for a specification, see 
Appendix 1).  
We run cross-country regressions, encompassing from 37 to 81 countries 
(depending on the model specification) over the period 1970-2000.9 Both the area of the 
index, “Freedom to exchange with foreigners,” as well as its five components “Taxes on 
international trade,” “Regulatory trade barriers,” “Actual size of trade sector compared to 
expected size,” “Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate,” and 
“International capital market controls” and their subcomponents are included as explanatory 
variables, along with standard variables from the empirical growth literature.  
The results indicate that the area “Freedom to exchange with foreigners” is, 
indeed, detrimental for growth. In this regard, we replicate the result of Carlsson and 
Lundström (2002), as in finding that the area “Legal structure and property rights” exerts a 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Dollar  (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Harrison (1996), Barro (1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Edwards 
(1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2002), Lindert and Williamson (2001), Ferreira and 
Rossi (2001), Greenaway et al. (2002), Irwin (2002a), Irwin and Terviö (2002), Tybout (2003), and the survey 
provided in Berg and Krueger (2003). Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) claim that the results in this literature are 
less trustworthy than has been claimed due to poor measures and methods; but Baldwin (2003) maintains that 
there are credible studies to the effect that openness is growth-enhancing in combination with a stable and 
nondiscriminatory exchange rate system, responsible fiscal and monetary policies and an absence of corruption. 
In fact, Rodrik (1998) finds a similar result: that trade exerts a positive, albeit small, effect on growth in sub-
Saharan Africa in the “right” institutional environment. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2001) likewise think there is a 
strong empirical case for free trade but criticize the usage of cross-country regressions to demonstrate it; rather, 
case studies are quoted and recommended. 
8 Along the same lines, O’Rourke (2000), in studying the pre-1914 period, finds that trade openness was 
negatively related to growth. Vamvakidis (2002) finds no support for a positive growth-openness connection 
before 1970 – the correlation is, indeed, negative for the period 1920–1940. Again, only after 1970 does openness 
entail growth. Irwin (2002b) argues that the positive relationship between tariffs and growth was driven by 
outliers, especially fast-growing Argentina and Canada, who used tariffs as a way of raising government revenue 
without protecting manufacturing. 
9 The aggregate EFI is available for the years 1970 (54 countries), 1975 (72 countries), 1980 (105 countries), 1985 
(111 countries), 1990 (113 countries), 1995 (123 countries) and 2000 (123 countries).  
  3strongly positive influence. Contrary to them, we also find that the positive effect of the area 
“Sound money” attains statistical significance, but that the area “Size of government” does 
not. When decomposing the index further in the area “Freedom to exchange with foreigners,” 
we find that one of its components, “Taxes on international trade,” seems to be the decisive 
factor behind the result. That is, the higher these taxes, the higher the growth rate. 
Decomposing the index even further, down to its most basic elements, does not yield more 
precise results.  
However, our more extensive sensitivity analysis (compared to that of Carlsson 
and Lundström, 2002) reveals that the negative result for “Freedom to exchange with 
foreigners” is not all that robust to changes in the sample or the specification of the model. In 
fact, using Least Trimmed Squares to identify outliers and Reweighted Least Squares to 
perform estimations without the outliers we get the result that “Freedom to exchange with 
foreigners” exerts a positive influence on growth! Likewise, looking at various subsamples of 
countries reveals that the negative effect primarily holds for some types (such as democratic, 
poor, and non-OECD countries) but not for others. This should make one cautious in 
accepting the finding of a negative relationship. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the data, 
followed by a section presenting the results, a sensitivity analysis, and a discussion of the 
results and how they can be understood. Concluding remarks close the paper. 
 
 
2.     The data 
 
Our data set consists of averages of economic freedom measures (1970−1995) and 
macroeconomic variables (1975−2000) for as many countries as possible. The variables used 
are specified in Table 1. 
 
  4Table 1.   Variable specifications and descriptive statistics for the countries included in the Table 4 regressions 
Variable 
name 







∆Y  Average annual percentage change in 1995 
constant USD per capita, 1975−2000 
78 1.284  2.018  6.160  -4.808  WDI 
Y75  Initial (1975) real GDP per capita in 1000 
constant 1995 USD. 
78 5.969  8.484  37.520  .149  WDI 
Y7074  Average real GDP per capita in 1000 constant 
1995 USD, 1970−1974 
78 5.813  8.892  44.165  .134  WDI 
INV  Average annual gross capital formation, per cent 
of GDP, 1975−2000 
78 22.520  5.382  39.177  10.768  WDI 
INV7074  Average annual gross capital formation, per cent 
of GDP, 1970−1974 
78 23.088  7.189  46.169  9.419  WDI 
SCHOOL  Percentage of “secondary school complete” in the 
total population, 1975 
78 7.609  8.534  49.100  .020  BL 
EFI  Economic freedom index, average 1970-1995  78  5.551  1.043  8.557  3.067  GL 
EFI1  Size of government: Expenditures, taxes, and 
enterprises, average 1970−1995 
78 5.440  1.512  9.535  2.418  GL 
EFI2  Legal structure and security of property rights, 
average 1970−1995 
78 5.091  1.619  8.410  2.023  GL 
EFI3  Access to sound money, average 1970−1995  78 6.311  1.702  9.580  1.795  GL 
EFI4  Freedom to exchange with foreigners, average 
1970−1995 
78 5.660  1.450  9.608  2.512  GL 
EFI5  Regulation of credit, labor, and business, average 
1970−1995 
78 5.445  .858  7.497  2.835  GL 
EFI4A  Taxes on international trade, average 1970−1995  78 5.813  2.252  9.900  .208  GL 
EFI4B    Regulatory trade barriers, average 1970−1995  37 6.691  1.624  9.300  3.330  GL 
EFI4C  Actual size of trade sector compared to expected 
size, average 1970−1995 
78 5.041  2.064  10.000  .207  GL 
EFI4D  Difference between official exchange rate and 
black market rate, average 1970−1995 
78 7.397  2.476  10.000  0  GL 
EFI4E  International capital market controls, average 
1970−1995 
78 2.874  2.627  9.885  0  GL 
EFI4CDE (EFI4C + EFI4D + EFI4E)/3 78 
 
5.104   1.700     9.569  1.012  GL 
EFI4Ai  Revenue from taxes on international trade as a 
percentage of exports plus imports, average 1970-
1995 
78 6.215  2.399  10.000  .458  GL 
EFI4Aii   Mean tariff rate, average 1970−1995  74 5.853  2.428  10.000  0  GL 
EFI4Aiii   Standard deviation of tariff rates, average 
1970−1995 
66 5.086  2.625  10.000  0  GL 
EFI4Ei  Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and 
foreign access to domestic capital markets, 
average 1970-1995 
37 8.018  1.302  9.540  4.660  GL 
EFI4Eii   Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage 
in capital market exchange with foreigners - index 
of capital controls among 13 IMF categories, 
average 1970−1995 
78 2.793  2.666  10.000  0  GL 
Note: WDI = World Development Indicators CD-Rom (World Bank, 2001); BL = Barro and Lee dataset at 
<http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee>; GL = Gwartney and Lawson (2002) or <http://www.freetheworld.com>. 
Note: EFI4Bi and EFI4Bii are not included in any regressions since data on the former are only available for the year 
2000, and hence, they are not included in this table. 
Note: All variables of the EFI are specified in Appendix 1 and range from 0 (“no economic freedom”) to 10 (“full 
economic freedom”). The components of the EFI, as well as weighting schemes, have changed in the various 
editions that have been published. Hence, when comparing studies, one needs to be careful to clarify which 
editions are used. 
 
The estimations are made on the basis of country averages of annual data for the time periods 
mentioned, except for Y75 and SCHOOL, which measure initial values, and except in the case 
of EFI data, which are only available at, and thus averaged over, five-year intervals. Since 
institutional variables, such as the EFI, are likely to have a long-run influence on economic 
growth, we have chosen to work with a cross-section rather than with a panel of countries. 
  5The EFI spans only a period of 30 years with no more than seven observations for each 
country. This leaves little time-series variation, especially if we would have used ten- or 
fifteen-year averages to avoid problems of short-run dynamics; and of course any fixed-
effects specification throws away the between-country variation. We have chosen not to work 
with initial or instrumented values (with the initial values as instruments) of the EFI. Such 
procedures are often used to handle endogeneity, but this problem will not be solved if the 
initial values of the EFI are themselves correlated with unobserved variables that are related 
to growth, or if the EFI depends on expected growth rates in the future. In addition, the 
quantity and arguably also the quality of the EFI components improve over time, making the 
focus on initial levels less desirable. 
The choice of explanatory variables is such as to include those that have 
generally been shown to be significantly and robustly related to growth (see e.g. Levine and 
Renelt, 1992 and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; cf. de Haan and Sturm, 2000, 2001). The EFI is added, 
in various ways, to investigate if it adds explanatory power, as we hypothesize it might.  
One advantage of using the EFI in testing this is that, unlike many other studies 
(as pointed out by e.g. Baldwin, 2002, and Clemens and Williamson, 2002) that use rather 
narrow measures of openness and that do not include other policy variables as regressors, it 
enables us to control for the growth effects of other market-oriented policy changes that often 
take place at the same time as trade liberalization.  
In central respects, the choice of variables, as well as the model specifications, 
mirror the Carlsson and Lundström (2002) study. Unlike their study, our include data for the 
EFI from 1995 and data for the other variables for the period 1996−2000. Moreover, the 
Fraser Institute constantly tries to improve the quality of the EFI, and new parts have been 
added in the latest version. 
Table 2 clarifies the way in which the central EFI area of concern in our study 
has changed from the version of index published in 2000 (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2000) 
and the one used here, published in 2002. 
 
  6Table 2.   A comparison of the 2000 and 2002 versions of the EFI with regard to free trade 
International exchange: Freedom to trade with 
foreigners (17.1 %) 
Freedom to exchange with foreigners (20 %) 
A Taxes on international trade   A Taxes on international trade  
i) Revenue from taxes on international trade as a 
percent of exports plus imports (23.3 %)) 
i) Revenue from taxes on international trade as a 
percentage of exports plus imports (6.7 %) 
ii) Mean tariff rate (24.6 %)  ii) Mean tariff rate (6.7 %) 
iii) Standard deviation of tariff rates (23.6 %)  iii) Standard deviation of tariff rates (6.7 %) 
B Non-tariff regulatory trade barriers   B Regulatory trade barriers. 
i) Percent of international trade covered by non-tariff 
trade restraints (19.4 %) 
i) Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than 
published tariffs and quotas (10.0 %)) 
ii) Actual size of trade sector compared to the expected 
size (9.1 %) 
ii) Costs of importing: The combined effect of import 
tariffs, licence fees, bank fees, and the time required for 
administrative red-tape raises costs of importing 
equipment by (10.0 %) 
  C Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size 
(20 %) 
  D Difference between official exchange rate and black 
market rate (20 %) 
  E International capital market controls 
  i) Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and 
foreign access to domestic capital markets (10.0 %) 
  ii) Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in 
capital market exchange with foreigners’ index of 
capital controls among 13 IMF categories (10.0 %) 
Note: The numbers in brackets are the assigned weights in the 2000 version of the EFI (determined by principal-
components analysis in 2000 and by simple averages in 2002).  
 
 
3.     The results 
 
3.1     The regression results 
 
As a first step, in order to see if the results of several other studies can be replicated, we 
regress real per capita GDP growth (∆Yi) on the summary index of economic freedom (EFI) 
using the following specification: 
 
                                 ∆Yi= α + β1Y75i + β2INVi + β3SCHOOLi + δEFIi + εi,                                       (1) 
 
where growth (∆Y) and the investment share of GDP (INV) are country averages between 
1975 and 2000 and where percentage of “secondary school complete” in the total population 
in 1975 (SCHOOL) is an initial value.10 To control for convergence, GDP per capita in 1975 
(Y75) is also included. EFI is measured as country averages between 1970 and 1995 since we 
expect the index to have a lagged effect on growth. The use of levels instead of changes is 
                                                 
10 For empirical arguments on why a stock rather than a flow is preferable for this kind of human-capital proxy (as 
in Romer’s, 1990, theoretical model), see Gemmell (1996) and Pritchett (1996). 
  7consistent with endogenous growth theory, where certain policy variables are assumed to 
affect economic growth.11 
Equation (1) is estimated by 2SLS. Y75 and INV have been instrumented with 
the average GDP per capita between 1970 and 1974 (Y7074) and the average investment 
share of GDP between 1970 and 1974 (INV7074). This is to ensure that β1 is not biased due to 
measurement error and that β2 is not overestimated due to endogeneity (as one can easily 
imagine that growth causes investment as well as the other way around).12  
As can be seen in Table 3, economic freedom has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on growth, and the three control variables are all statistically significant 
with the predicted signs.13 
 
Table 3.   Estimation with the summary EFI 
 Coefficient  Std.  Error 
EFI .8603**  .1768 
Y75IV -.1307**  .0367 
INVIV .1455* .0640 
SCHOOL .0709*  .0296 
Constant -6.5136** 1.4174 
R-squared .48 
# obs.  81 
Note: The dependent variable is ∆Y. The two variables with the superscript IV refer to instrumented variables with 
EFI, SCHOOL, Y7074 and INV7074 as instruments. Huber-White robust standard errors are used.  
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
 
We continue by studying the five areas that together make up the summary 
index in order to get a clearer picture of what, more exactly, in the EFI that affects growth, 
and in what way. This specification (called the first specification in Table 4) is written 
 
                                   ∆Yi= α + β1Y75i+ β2INVi+ β3SCHOOLi +Σj δj EFIji + εi,                                (2) 
 
where EFIji is area j (j=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) of the EFI in country i. As before, 2SLS is used. 
 
                                                 
11 Since economic growth is a stationary variable, Jones (1995) has questioned theories in which permanent 
changes in policy variables have permanent effects on growth. See Lundström (2003: 52) for a reply concerning 
the relationship between growth and levels of economic freedom. 
12 Cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 431) and Temple (1999: 129). 
13 If nothing else is mentioned, all reported regressions pass a skewness/kurtosis test and a Shapiro-Wilk W test 
for normally distributed residuals, and a linktest for specification errors. 
  8Table 4.   Estimation with the five areas of the EFI 





























EFI42     .0774* 
(.0382) 
39.63 

























R-squared .58  .60 
# obs.  78  78 
Condition number  4.2  18.9 
Note: The dependent variable is ∆Y. The two variables with the superscript IV refer to instrumented variables with 
EFIj, j = 1,…,5, SCHOOL, Y7074 and INV7074 as instruments in the first specification, with EFI42 added in the 
second specification. Huber-White robust standard errors are used.  
Note: Values for Y75 and EFI4 for all countries included in these regressions are presented in Table A2. Two 
scatterplots of these values are presented in Figures A1 and A2. 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
According to the estimates of the first specification in Table 4, three of the five areas of the 
EFI have a statistically significant effect on growth. In particular, we reproduce Carlsson and 
Lundström’s (2002) surprising negative effect of area 4 ”Freedom to exchange with 
foreigners,”14 as well as their positive effect of area 2 “Legal structure and property rights”. 
Contrary to Carlsson and Lundström we also find that the positive effect of the third area 
“Sound money” attains statistical significance, but that the first area “Size of government” 
does not.15 Table 4 also includes variance inflation factors and the condition number for the 
explanatory variables. Neither of these indicators suggests that severe multicollinearity 
(presumably due to close resemblance of certain areas) is at hand in the first specification. 
                                                 
14 It has been argued by Bhagwati (1999) that free trade and freedom for capital are two distinct phenomena with 
different effects on e.g. growth. Consequently, we ran a regression like the first specification in Table 4 but 
excluding components 4B (for reasons outlined below in connection with Table 5) and 4E “International capital 
market controls.” The effect of this new variable on growth is negative but insignificant. 
15 We get very similar results if we instead use PPP-adjusted or chain-weighted growth rates. The most notable 
difference is that the negative effect of EFI4 only attains statistical significance at the ten percent level with PPP-
adjusted growth rates. 
  9As can be seen, a second specification with the square of EFI4 has also been 
estimated.16 Investigating the effects of the squares of the EFI variables is not something 
directly suggested by theoretical considerations, but neither is it discouraged. The results 
from the first specification hold, and the fact that EFI42 is positive and significant implies a 
U-shaped functional form which, however, is associated with non-positive growth throughout 
the EFI range of 0-10. An EFI4 value of about 8.5 yields the most negative effect, while values 
both to its left and its right are associated with less negative growth. As can be expected, signs 
of collinearity are evident between EFI4 and its square.  
  The surprising finding that area 4 “Freedom to exchange with foreigners” 
reduces growth calls for further examination. A natural step is to disaggregate this area into 
its five components. Table 5 contains the estimation results from such a disaggregation. The 
table contains three specifications. Component 4B “Regulatory trade barriers” is excluded 
from the second and the third specifications since  it is only available for 37 countries. In 
consequence, the gain in efficiency from excluding component 4B is probably worth the cost 
in terms of risking omitted variable bias. Moreover, the variance inflation factors of EFI2 and 
Y75 both improve from possibly troublesome levels, and the residuals become normally 
distributed, when component 4B is excluded. In the third specification, the average of the 
components 4C, 4D, and 4E is used rather than the individual components. As before, 2SLS 
is used.  
 
                                                 
16 The reason for only including the square of EFI4 is that results (not included here) show that when all EFI 
variables are squared, only EFI42 turns out significant; and when all EFI variables are squared one at a time, 
again, only EFI42 turns out significant. In addition, EFI4 is our central variable of interest in the first place. 
  10Table 5.   Estimation with the five components of area 4 of the EFI 
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R-squared .55  .62  .59 
# obs.  37  78  78 
Condition number  6.99  5.09  4.6 
Note: The dependent variable is ∆Y. The two variables with the superscript IV refer to instrumented variables with 
EFIj, j = 1, 2, 3, 5, EFI4k, k = A,…, E (in the first specification; in the second, B is excluded; in the third, C, D, and E 
are measured as a composite), SCHOOL, Y7074 and INV7074 as instruments. Huber-White robust standard 
errors are used. 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
 
Focusing on the second specification in Table 5, we see that none of the four components in 
area 4 of the EFI turns out statistically significant; but component 4A “Taxes on international 
trade” is very close (with a significance level of 5.2 %). The third specification, where the 
other components of area 4 are put together into a composite measure, renders component 
4A statistically significant. Hence, this variable appears to be behind the negative effect of 
free trade on growth: the higher the tariffs, the higher the growth rate (as economic freedom, 
which is the measure used in the regressions, and tariffs are negatively related by definition). 
Furthermore, 4A is the only component that attains statistical significance if we include 
component 4A to 4E one at a time.17 Table 5 includes variance inflation factors and the 
condition number for the explanatory variables. Neither of these indicators suggests that 
severe multicollinearity is at hand.  
                                                 
17 The estimates are available upon request. 
  11Finally, we decompose area 4 “Freedom to exchange with foreigners” even 
further, down to its most basic elements. Component 4A is made up of three subcomponents: 
4Ai “Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports,” 4Aii 
“Mean tariff rate,” and 4Aiii “Standard deviation of tariff rates.” Component 4E is made up of 
two subcomponents: 4Ei “Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to 
domestic capital markets,” and 4Eii “Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in 
capital market exchange with foreigners.” Component 4B is also made up of two 
subcomponents, but since one of them (4Bii “Cost of importing”) is only available in the year 
2000, they cannot be included in the regressions. The results are not very impressive; see 
Appendix 3 for details. Of all the included explanatory variables in the first specification, only 
EFI2, EFI 4D and INV are statistically significant. However, the first specification in Table A1 
suffers from the same problems as the first specification in Table 5: the sample consists of 
only 37 countries, some of the variance inflation factors are rather high, and the residuals are 
not distributed normally. In order to increase the number of included countries we again 
exclude EFI4B, and also replace EFI4Ei and EFI4Eii with EFI4E, since EFI4Eii is only available for 
a limited number of countries. But there are still few discernible effects of the included 
subcomponents: only Y75 and EFI2 are significant. In the second specification, residuals are 
distributed normally, but some signs of multicollinearity are present. However, if we replace 
EFI4 in the first specification in Table 4 with EFI4Ai, EFI4Aii, and EFI4Aiii one at a time, only 
EFI4Aii ”Mean tariff rate” attains statistical significance.18 
To conclude, although the last disaggregation is not very informative, if any 
subcomponent is behind the effect of EFI4A “Taxes on international trade”, it is possibly 
EFI4Aii ”Mean tariff rate.” The higher this rate, the higher the growth rate. 
 
3.2.     Sensitivity analysis 
 
We have carried out two types of sensitivity analysis in order to detect whether the EFI 
results are robust: a test of the sensitivity of the results to the specification of the model and 
some tests of the sensitivity of the results to the sample. 
The first test entails using two types of methods, the Extreme Bounds Analysis 
used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and the less strict robustness test of Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
The former reports an upper and a lower bound for parameter estimates based on a number 
of regressions with different combinations of regressors; a coefficient is defined to be robust 
if its two bounds have the same sign. The latter thinks this approach too demanding and 
instead argues in favor of analyzing the entire distribution of the parameter estimates, 
defining robustness as holding when the averaged 90 percent confidence interval of a 
                                                 
18 The estimates are available upon request. 
  12coefficient does not include zero. Like Sturm and de Haan (2002a) we use an unweighted 
version of this test.19 This sensitivity analysis includes 16 of the 22 variables that according to 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) appear to be “significant,” as well as Life Expectancy. We have excluded 
the variables that are similar to the EFI variables. This gives rise to the following list of 
included variables: 
 
1.  Regional variables: Sub-Saharan Africa (dummy), Latin America (dummy), Absolute 
Latitude. 
2.  Political variables: Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Number of Revolutions and Coups, 
War dummy. 
3.  Religious variables: Fraction Buddhist, Fraction Muslim, Fraction Catholic, Fraction 
Protestant. (We have not been able to find Fraction Confucian.)  
4.  Types of investment: Equipment Investment, Non-Equipment Investment. 
5.  Primary sector production: Fraction of Primary Products in Total Exports, Fraction of 
GDP in Mining. 
6.  Former Spanish Colonies. 
7. Life  Expectancy.20 
 
For each regression we add one of the 680 possible triplets of the above variables to equation 
(2). The results are reported in Table 6, with and without the Type of investment variables, 
which, when included, reduce the sample to almost half the size. 
 
Table 6.   Significance shares for the EFI variables when altering the model specification 
N=680      N=455       
  10 % sign  5 % sign  10 % sign  5 % sign    10% sign  5% sign  10% sign  5% sign 
 % % # #  % %  # # 
EFI1 3.971  .294  27  2  EFI1 4.654  .440 21  2 
EFI2 95.294 87.794 648  597  EFI2 99.560 98.462  453  448 
EFI3 58.824 34.412 400  234  EFI3 84.176 51.429  383  234 
EFI4 40.441 23.088  275  157  EFI4 51.868 40.230  236  183 
EFI5 .147  .000  1  0  EFI5 1.099  .000 5  0 
Note: The first five columns include equipment and non-equipment investment whereas the latter five do not. “N” 
refers to the number of regressions run. 
 
EFI4 “Freedom to exchange with foreigners” is not robustly related to growth. 
Even when excluding the Type of investment variables and using the 10 percent significance 
level the share of statistically significant coefficients is a meager 52 percent. The only area of 
the EFI that passes the test (of significance at the 10 percent level in at least 90 percent of the 
                                                 
19 See Sturm and de Haan (2002b) for a critique of Sala-i-Martin’s weighted approach. 
20 For more detailed information on the variables included in the robustness analysis, see Table A3.  
  13regressions) is EFI2 “Legal structure and property rights.”21 In their sensitivity analysis, 
Carlsson and Lundström (2002) only varied the included areas of the EFI.22 We have shown 
that their claim that “Freedom to exchange with foreigners” is negatively and robustly related 
to growth does not appear to stand when other explanatory variables are incorporated in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
The second type of test investigates whether only certain countries drive the 
results, i.e. if outliers that are not representative have a decisive influence on the estimated 
coefficients. The first method used is Least Trimmed Squares (LTS), the idea of which is to fit 
the majority of the data and, after that, to identify outliers as the cases with large residuals 
(see Sturm and de Haan, 2002a).23 After this identification, we use Reweighted Least Squares 
(RLS) for inference by giving outliers (defined as countries with a residual the absolute value 
of which is greater than 2.5 times the standard error of the LTS regression) the weight zero 
and other countries the weight one. This procedure concentrates on the observations that 
best approximates the estimated model. The advantage of LTS compared with single-case 
diagnostics like Cook’s distance and DFITS is that it can handle cases with several jointly 
influential observations.  
The estimates in Table 7 reveal that EFI4 is positively correlated with growth 
when 24 outlying observations are excluded. The sign of EFI3 (now negative) also changes 
with the exclusion. The estimates in Table 7 should of course not be seen as evidence of a 
positive relationship between free trade and growth, but at least they indicate that 
measurement errors (which are common in the national accounts of less developed 
countries) or parameter heterogeneity (which is likely in cross country regressions) might 
explain the negative coefficient for EFI4 in Table 4. 24 
 
                                                 
21 The critical extreme bounds for EFI3 and EFI4 are reported in Table A4. 
22 We have performed this type of analysis as well (although it might be problematic to use a method which looks 
at the effect of eliminating variables thought to be of relevance for growth). When eliminating up to three of the 
EFI variables and re-estimating the model (14 times per EFI area), we only found EFI2 to be robust at the 10 and 5 
percent levels. EFI4 only obtained a significance share of 21.4 % (5 % level) and 35.7 % (10 % level). 
23 We minimize the sum of the 44 smallest residuals, ((observations+parameters+1)/2) which is the default in 
SAS.  
24 The definition of outliers is of course arbitrary. If we instead only use the 61 countries with a residual that is 
smaller than 4 times the standard error of the LTS regression, the coefficient for EFI4 is positive but not 
statistically significant. The smallest number of countries that we can drop in this procedure and still get a positive 
coefficient is 14: Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malta, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela, Zambia. To do away with the statistical significance of the 
negative coefficient for EFI4 we only need to drop Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
  14Table 7.   Least Trimmed/Reweighted Least Squares estimation with the five areas of the EFI 
  Coefficient 
(std. error) 
EFI1 Size of government  .0845 
(.0585) 
EFI2 Legal structure and property rights  .4134** 
(.0719) 
EFI3 Sound money  -.4324** 
(.0590) 
EFI4 Freedom to exchange with foreigners  .2675** 
(.0695) 











# obs  54 
Note: The dependent variable is ∆Y. The two variables with the superscript IV refer to instrumented variables with 
EFIj, j = 1,…,5, SCHOOL, Y7074 and INV7074 as instruments. Huber-White robust standard errors are used.  
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
Note: The following 24 countries are given weight zero: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, South 
Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirate, Venezuela, Zambia. 
Note: All observations are used to construct the instruments in the first stage regressions. 
 
In addition, we have varied the sample manually in various ways, dividing the sample into 
different groups in order to see if the results (using 2SLS) hold only for countries with certain 
characteristics. The divisions that have been undertaken, and the basic results, are the 
following:25 
 
1.  Rich or poor: The negative effect of EFI4 holds for poor countries (with Y75 less than 
the median) and is positive but not statistically significant for rich countries. 
2.  Democratic or non-democratic: The effect of EFI4 is positive in less democratic 
countries, as measured by the variables Avgpolright (not statistically significant) and 
Avgcivillib (statistically significant at the 10 percent level); and the effect is negative 
and statistically significant for more democratic countries. 
3.  OECD or non-OECD: The negative effect of EFI4 holds for non-OECD countries and is 
positive but not statistically significant for OECD countries (only 20 of them). 
4.  OPEC or non-OPEC: The negative effect of EFI4 holds for non-OPEC countries and is 
negative but not statistically significant for the OPEC countries: hence, the negative 
effect of EFI4 does not stem from the oil-exporting countries and the theoretical 
possibility of their combining high growth and relatively high tariffs. 
                                                 
25 See Table A3 for variable definitions. All estimations are available on request. 
  155.  Continents and groups of countries: The negative result for EFI4 holds when 
excluding Tiger economies in Asia (with a theoretical possibility of their being closed 
but fast-growing); there is a particularly strong negative effect of EFI4 in Latin 
America; otherwise few interesting results are obtained. 
 
3.3.     Discussion 
 
Finding that free trade exerts a negative influence on growth – as found not only by us in our 
2SLS regressions but also by Carlsson and Lundström (2002) – is surprising. But the fact 
that many other studies have found the opposite result, as mentioned above, should make 
one cautious, as should, indeed, our own findings that the result is not really robust. Having 
noted that it is not robust, there are several alternative explanations of the seemingly 
negative relationship: 
 
i)  The relationship between free trade and growth might be a contingent one. Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) point out that trade might reduce growth in countries that do not 
specialize in research and development or other growth-promoting activities. The 
estimates from our different divisions of the sample give some support for such an 
interpretation. 
ii)  Even if there is a partial correlation between area 4 of the EFI and growth, the 
causality is unclear, especially given the model specification using averages. It could 
be that higher growth rates lead to higher tariffs rather than the other way around. It 
could also be that the two are jointly determined. In fact, Dawson (2003) finds no 
evidence of causality, using the Granger test, in either direction between this area of 
the EFI and growth (using the 2001 version of the index). 
iii)  The effect of one variable, such as free trade, is not always manifested in the 
coefficient of the variable itself but through other variables that are themselves 
related to growth. One such candidate is investment.26 If we estimate the first 
specification in Table 4 without investment, the coefficient for EFI4 becomes less 
                                                 
26 Levine and Renelt (1992: 953−956) find a non-robust relationship between trade and growth but a robust, 
positive relationship between trade and investment, as between investment and growth. If one removes 
investment in the regressions, the relationship between trade and growth turns strong, suggesting an effect of 
trade on growth via investment. Note, however, that the scope of trade is not the same thing as trade openness. Of 
the former, unlike the latter, Sala-i Martin (1997) finds a robust, negative effect. De Haan and Sturm (2000: 
17−18) find that economic freedom does not affect growth through investments. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
(2002) find that certain institutions are the most crucial factor for economic development: when such institutions 
are controlled for, trade often turns insignificant and, interestingly, negative. The other areas of the EFI might be 
considered our version of their institutions. It bears noting that they find that trade influences institutions in a 
positive manner. 
  16negative (-.27) and statistically insignificant. Thus free trade might promote growth 
through investment. The correlation coefficient between EFI4 and INV is .29 and 
when regressing INV on EFI4 and a constant, the coefficient for EFI4 (1.28) is highly 
statistically significant. The same is true if we also include the other areas of the EFI 
in the regression. 
iv)  Less free trade could induce more growth if trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
are substitutes and if it is combined with freedom for FDI.27  
v)  Perhaps some countries are able to act as price makers on the international market, 
using trade policy strategically, and it may be that they have higher growth rates. 
vi)  It might be that looking at EFI ratings without taking the strategic dimensions of 
trade policy into account, such that nations could choose to act on the basis of how 
they expect others to act, misses many important factors.  
vii)  It is possible to question the way the EFI measures area 4, both in terms of the 
variables used in components and subcomponents, and in terms of how they are 
actually measured. Some subjective measures (from the Global Competitiveness 
Report) are used (although in some model specifications above, they are not 
included); the weights applied could be questioned (although that is less of a problem 
when running regressions on the decomposed index); the way in which the actual 
measures are transformed into index figures ranging from 0 to 10 can be questioned 
(for details, see Appendix 2); some countries have no EFI scores for the early five-year 
periods covered, and it could be that there is some systematic effect involved 
involving them; etc. 
viii)  It could be that cross-country regression studies do not use a methodology suitable to 
investigating the effect of free trade on growth, as Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2001) 
have argued at length. Some main points of criticism: regression analyses are seldom 
based on firm theoretical ground and when they are, the linkage between theoretical 
and empirical specifications is often weak; the problem of causality; and the 
explanatory variables are often measured badly. We do think this view to be overly 
pessimistic but recognize the need to study the whole body of literature before making 
policy pronouncements. 
 
Hence, we recommend great caution in using the empirical findings reported here and, e.g., 
by Carlsson and Lundström (2002) with regard to proposing a certain trade policy.  
 
                                                 
27 For example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) show that tariffs reduce the exports/FDI ratio; and Keller and 
Yeaple (2003) show that a reduction in this ratio is beneficial for growth. Whether trade and FDI are substitutes 
or complements is not clear in several other studies: see, e.g., Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Spasford (1996), 
Goldberg and Klein (1999), and Blonigen (2001). 
  17 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
It is widely believed that free trade is growth-promoting, and a number of studies confirm 
this result. However, the relatively new dataset that forms the Economic Freedom Index has 
been used to show the opposite result (Carlsson and Lundström, 2002). In using a newer 
version of the index, and hence partly new data, we likewise find that the area “Freedom to 
exchange with foreigners” is associated with slower growth. By decomposing the index even 
further, we can establish that the component “Taxes on international trade” seems to drive 
this result – the higher these taxes, the higher the growth.  
However, performing a sensitivity analysis reveals that this negative result is 
not robust. A robustness test of the model specification reveals that “Freedom to exchange 
with foreigners” is significant in only 40 percent of the cases at the 5 percent significance 
level and in only 52 percent of the cases at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the results are 
sensitive to the sample used. When using LTS to identify outliers and RLS for inference, the 
variable turns out significant and positive. Likewise, dividing the sample of countries into 
different groups reveals that the negative result only holds for some types of countries 
whereas other types are characterized by a positive result. (Carlsson and Lundström, 2002, 
do not perform these kinds of tests.) The implication is that the negative result reported in 
OLS and 2SLS regressions should be interpreted with great caution. 
  Decomposing the index, we not only find the negative result in the area 
“Freedom to exchange with foreigners” but also positive results in the areas “Legal structure 
and property rights” and “Sound money.” The controversial issue of whether a large 
government is growth-reducing or not is not solved here, as the area “Size of government” 
does not turn out significant. (In the LTS/RLS analysis, the coefficient of “Sound money” 
changes sign and “Regulations becomes positive and significant.) 
By using the EFI rather than more narrow measures of openness, we are able to 
control for the growth effects of other market-oriented policy changes that often take place at 
the same time as trade liberalization – and hence, we avoid a methodological problem 
encountered by many other cross-country studies in this area. So clearly, there is scope for 
more detailed studies of the free trade-growth relationship (as well as between other areas of 
the index and growth). In the paper, we have identified several actual and potential 
weaknesses of the tests thus far, such as unclear causality, outliers, model specification, 
country selection, data quality, etc. We have tried to resolve a few of these problems. 
Nevertheless, caution is recommended when it comes to presenting policy advice.  
 
 
  18Appendix 1: The areas, components, and subcomponents of the EFI 
 
1  Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
A  General government consumption spending as a percentage of total  
consumption 
B  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
C  Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP 
D  Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies) 
2  Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
A  Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to  
interference by the government or parties in disputes (GCR) 
B  Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to  
challenge the legality of government actions or regulation (GCR) 
C  Protection of intellectual property (GCR) 
D  Military interference in rule of law and the political process (ICRG) 
E  Integrity of the legal system (ICRG) 
3  Access to Sound Money 
A  Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus  
average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years 
B Standard inflation variability in the last five years 
C Recent inflation rate 
D  Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad 
4  Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners 
A  Taxes on international trade 
i  Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of  
exports plus imports 
ii  Mean tariff rate 
iii  Standard deviation of tariff rates 
B  Regulatory trade barriers. 
i  Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs  
and quotas (GCR) 
ii  Costs of importing: The combined effect of import tariffs,  
licence fees, bank fees, and the time required for administrative  
red-tape raises costs of importing equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 = more than 
50%) (GCR) 
C  Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size. 
D  Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate  
E  International capital market controls 
i  Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to  
domestic capital markets (GCR) 
ii  Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital  
market exchange with foreigners –  index of capital controls among  
13 IMF categories. 
5  Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
A  Credit Market Regulations 
i  Ownership of banks: Percentage of deposits held in privately  
owned banks 
ii  Competition: Domestic banks face competition from foreign  
banks (GCR) 
iii  Extension of credit: Percentage of credit extended to private  
sector 
iv  Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to  
negative real interest rates 
v  Interest rate controls: Interest rate controls on bank deposits  
and/or loans are freely determined by the market (GCR) 
B Labor Market Regulations 
i  Impact of minimum wage: The minimum wage, set by law, has  
little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed (GCR) 
ii Hiring and Þ ring practices: Hiring and firing practices of  
companies are determined by private contract (GCR) 
iii  Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized  
collective bargaining (GCR) 
iv Unemployment Benefits: The unemployment benefits system  
preserves the incentive to work (GCR) 
v  Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel 
C  Business Regulations 
i  Price controls: Extent to which businesses are free to set their  
own prices 
  19ii  Administrative conditions and new businesses: Administrative  
procedures are an important obstacle to starting a new business  
(GCR) 
iii  Time with government bureaucracy: Senior management  
spends a substantial amount of time dealing with government  
bureaucracy (GCR) 
iv  Starting a new business: Starting a new business is generally  
easy (GCR) 
v  Irregular payments: Irregular, additional payments connected  
with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange  
controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications  
are very rare (GCR) 
Note: GCR = Global Competitiveness Report; ICRG = International Country Risk Guide 
 
 
  20Appendix 2: Data description for area 4 “Freedom to exchange with foreigners” 
 
A  Taxes on international trade 
 
i  Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports 
The formula used to calculate the ratings for this component was: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) multiplied by 10. 
Vi represents the revenue derived from taxes on international trade as a share of the trade sector. The values for 
Vmin and Vmax were set at 0% and 15%, respectively. This formula leads to lower ratings as the average tax rate 
on international trade increases. Countries with no specific taxes on international trade earn a perfect 10. As the 
revenues from these taxes rise toward 15% of international trade, ratings decline toward zero. (Note that, except 
for two or three extreme observations, the revenues from taxes on international trade as a share of the trade sector 
are within the 0% to 15% range).  
 
ii  Mean tariff rate 
The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 rating for each country was: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) multiplied by 
10. Vi represents the country’s mean tariff rate. The values for Vmin and Vmax were set at 0% and 50%, 
respectively. This formula will allocate a rating of 10 to countries that do not impose tariffs. As the mean tariff rate 
increases, countries are assigned lower ratings. The rating will decline toward zero as the mean tariff rate 
approaches 50%. (Note that, except for two or three extreme observations, all countries have mean tariff rates 
within this 0% to 50% range.)  
 
iii  Standard deviation of tariff rates. 
Compared to a uniform tariff, wide variation in tariff rates exerts a more restrictive impact on trade and, 
therefore, on economic freedom. Thus, countries with greater variation in their tariff rates should be given lower 
ratings. The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 ratings for this component was: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) 
multiplied by 10. Vi represents the standard deviation of the country’s tariff rates. The values for Vmin and Vmax 
were set at 0% and 25%, respectively. This formula will allocate a rating of 10 to countries that impose a uniform 
tariff. As the standard deviation of tariff rates increases toward 25%, ratings decline toward zero. (Note that, 
except a few very extreme observations, the standard deviations of the tariff rates for the countries in our study 
fall within this 0% to 25% range.)  
 
B  Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 
i  Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas. 
 
ii  Costs of importing: the combined effect of import tariffs, licence fees, bank fees, and the time required for 
administrative red-tape raises costs of importing equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 = more than 50%). This 
component is based on survey responses to this question obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report 2000.  
 
C  Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size 
Regression analysis was used to derive an expected size of the trade sector based on various structural and 
geographic characteristics. The actual size of the trade sector was then compared with the expected size for the 
country. If the actual size of the trade sector is greater than expected, this figure will be positive. If it is less than 
expected, the number will be negative. The percent change of the negative numbers was adjusted to make it 
symmetrical with the percent change of the positive numbers. The following formula was used to place the figures 
on a 0-to-10 scale: (Vi - Vmin) / (Vmax - Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the country’s actual value for the 
component. Vmax and Vmin were set at 100% and -50%, respectively. (Note that -50% is symmetrical with 
+100%.) This procedure allocates higher ratings to countries with large trade sectors compared to what would be 
expected, given their population, geographic size, and location. On the other hand, countries with small trade 
sectors relative to the expected size receive lower ratings. 
 
D  Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate 
The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 ratings for this component was the following: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - 
Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the country’s black-market exchange rate premium. The values for Vmin and Vmax 
were set at 0% and 50%, respectively. This formula will allocate a rating of 10 to countries without a black-market 
exchange rate; i.e., those with a domestic currency that is fully convertible without restrictions. When exchange 
rate controls are present and a black market exists, the ratings will decline toward zero as the black market 
premium increases toward 50%. A zero rating is given when the black market premium is equal to, or greater 
than, 50%.  
 
E  International capital market controls 
 
i  Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets. 
 
ii  Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners – index of capital 
controls among 13 IMF categories. 
  21The IMF reports on 13 different types of capital controls. This component is based on the number of capital 
controls levied. The 0-to-10 rating is constructed by taking 13 minus the number of capital controls divided by 13 
and multiplied by 10. 
 
Note: For sources, see Gwartney and Lawson (2002: 26−28). 
 
 
  22Appendix 3: Various tables and figures 
 
Table A1.   Estimations with the subcomponents of area 4 of the EFI 









































EFI4B Regulatory trade barriers  -.0025 
(.3127) 
3.65    
EFI4C Actual size of trade sector compared 
to expected size 
.4500 
(.2227) 
3.49    .1383 
(.1450) 
2.05 
EFI4D Difference between official 






EFI4E International capital market 
controls 
   -.0416 
(.1221) 
2.30 
EFI4Ei Access to capital markets  .0725 
(.4135) 
2.16    
EFI4Eii Restrictions on capital market 
exchange with foreigners 
-.3803* 
(.1766) 
3.86    

























R-squared .56  .41 
# obs.  37  66 
Condition number  9.78  6.95 
Note: The dependent variable is ∆Y. The two variables with the superscript IV refer to instrumented variables 
with, in the first specification, EFIj, j = 1, 2, 3, 5, EFI4k, k = B, C, D, EFI4An, n = i, ii, iii, EFI4Ep, p= i, ii, SCHOOL, 
Y7074 and INV7074, and in the second specification, EFIj, j = 1, 2, 3, 5, EFI4k, k = B, C, D, E, EFI4An, n = i, ii, iii, 
SCHOOL, Y7074 and INV7074 as instruments. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
 
Table A2.   Values for ∆75 and EFI4 for the countries included in the regressions presented in Table 4 












  23Canada 1.670 7.665
Central Afr. Rep.  -1.044 5.160
Chile 3.383 5.567
Colombia 1.385 4.247
Congo, Dem. R.  -4.808 5.037
Congo, Rep. Of  .442 6.323
Costa Rica  1.513 5.920
Denmark 1.616 7.022
Dominican Rep.  2.114 4.453
Ecuador .519 5.253
Egypt 3.713 3.958






































South Africa  -.617 6.453
South Korea  6.160 6.160
Sri Lanka  3.340 4.480





Trinidad & Tob.  1.909 4.614
Tunisia 2.472 5.083
Turkey 2.088 3.538
Unit. Arab Em.  -3.408 8.318
United Kingdom  1.948 7.620





Sources: See Table 1. 
 
 
Table A3.   Variable specifications and descriptive statistics for the countries included in the sensitivity analysis 
Variable 
name 









Afr  Dummy for sub-Saharan countries; 1 for yes, 0 
otherwise 
78 .2308  .424 1.000  .000  LMI 
Lac  Dummy for Latin American countries; 1 for yes, 
0 otherwise 
78 .2821  .453 1.000  .000  LMI 
Latitude  Degrees of absolute latitude 78  23.966  16.672  63.892  .513  HJ 
Avgpolright Average  index  number for political rights, 
1975−2000 
76 3.369  1.828  6.577  1.000  FH 
Avgcivillib Average  index  number for civil liberties, 
1975−2000 
76 3.491  1.613 6.769  1.000  FH 
Revc  Average number of revolutions and coups per 
year, 1960−84 
73 .187  .249 1.15  .000  LR 
War  Dummy for countries that participated in at 
least one external war over the period 1960−85 
76 .355 .482 1.000  .000  BL 
Bud  Fraction of Buddhists 1980, percent 77  3.5195  14.60  92.100  .000  WCE 
Mus  Fraction of Muslims 1980, percent 77  17.364  32.15  99.400  .000  WCE 
Cat  Fraction of Catholics 1980, percent  77  35.952  37.97  99.700  .100  WCE 
Prot  Fraction of protestants 1980, percent 77  13.970  23.67  100.000  .000  WCE 
Equip  Equipment share of investment, averaged for 
1970−85 
47 .053 .033 .177  .015  DLS 
Nequip Non-equipment  share  of investment, averaged 
for 1970−85 
47 .148  .058 .285  .028  DLS 
Mining  Fraction of GDP in mining, 1988, percent  78  .261  1.764  15.617  -.014  HJ 
Fppte  Share of manufacturing exports in total exports 
1970 
72 .288 .295 1.040  .000  SW 
Spacol  Dummy for former Spanish colonies; 1 for yes, 
0 otherwise 
78 .231  .424 1.000  .000  Mixed 
source
s 
Lifeexp  Life expectancy in years  78  60.746  10.552  75.498  37.112  WDI 
Note: The numbers of observations refer to the regression used with the highest number of observations for any 
variable.  
Note: LMI = A Database of Labor Market Indicators Across Countries, Rama and Artecona (1999); HJ = Data 
Appendix from Hall and Jones (1999)  <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/datasets.html> ; FH = Freedom 
House Country Ratings, Annual Survey of Freedom Country Scores <www.freedomhouse.org>; LR = Levine and 
Renelt (1992) <www.http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddlevren.htm>; BL = Barro and Lee dataset 
<http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee>; WCE = World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett, 1982); DLS = De Long 
and Summers (1991); SW = Sachs and Warner (1995); WDI = World Development Indicators CD-Rom (World 
Bank, 2001). 
Note: The minimum value of Mining, -.014, is reported in the original source (Iceland), as is the maximum value 
of Fppte, 1.04 (Pakistan). 
  25Table A4.   The ten “worst” regressions for EFI2, EFI3 and EFI4 when testing the sensitivity of the model 
specification  
  EFI2   EFI3   EFI4  
1 -.135  boq -.188  abo  .368 aho 
2 -.073  beq -.183  bho .345  ajo 
3     -.183  bko .345  abo 
4     -.171 hio  .335  aco 
5     -.170  bio .333  hoq 
6     -.162 ino  .332  ano 
7     -.160  bjo .331  aop 
8     .155 iko  .322  aoq 
9     -.153 fio .311  boq 
10     -.153 fho  .309  joq 
Note: The first row gives the critical extreme bound for EFI3 (the lowest bound for a 95 percent confidence 
interval) and EFI4 (the highest bound for a 95 percent confidence interval). The second row gives the critical 
extreme bound in absence of the variable combination in the first row et cetera. 
Note: a = Sub-Saharan Africa, b = Latin America, c = Absolute Latitude, d = Political Rights, h = Fraction 
Buddhist, i = Fraction Muslim, k = Fraction Catholic, n = Fraction Protestant, o = Fraction of Primary Products in 
Total Export, p = Former Spanish Colonies, q = Life Expectancy 
Note: Equipment Investment and Non-Equipment Investment are not included in the regressions. 
 
Figure A1.   Values for EFI and ∆Y for the countries included in the regressions presented in Table 4 
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Sources: See Table 1. 
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